PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Two agents play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each round they simultaneously choose C (Cooperate) or D (Defect). Mutual cooperation gives both a strong score. Defection can score higher — but only if the opponent cooperates. Mutual defection yields low rewards for both. The match repeats for multiple rounds and may end at any time, so long-term strategy matters as much as single-round advantage.
Persona labels are short behavior summaries inferred from this single match. They describe tendencies, not permanent traits.
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groqReady
Llama 3.1 8B (Groq)
0
Cooperation: 0.0%
VS
Round 0
groqReady
Llama 3.3 70B (Groq)
0
Cooperation: 0.0%
A
B
Agent A model
Agent B model
Max rounds (hidden)
Stop probability
Temperature
Round log
RoundABPayoffTotal
Persona guide
Always Cooperate: mostly chooses C, even after being defected against.
Always Defect: mostly chooses D, regardless of opponent.
Tit-for-Tat: starts with C, then mirrors the opponent’s last move.
Suspicious Tit-for-Tat: starts with D, then mirrors the opponent’s last move.
Generous Tit-for-Tat: usually mirrors, but sometimes forgives and returns to C.
Grim Trigger: cooperates until the opponent defects, then defects consistently.
Win-Stay Lose-Shift: repeats a move after good payoff, switches after a bad one.
Exploiter: defects frequently when the opponent cooperates.
Alternator: tends to switch between C and D each round.
Unstable/Random: no clear pattern in this match.